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Abstract 
Since its emergence in the early eighties, persistence has become an important branch of Computer Science. Many persistent 
systems have now been developed and a wide variety of related issues have been well researched. Two areas which have 
received little attention are metadata management and security enforcement. This paper investigates the incorporation of 
these features into an existing persistence machine. The CPOMS (Persistent Object Management System in C) was used 
as a vehicle for the study, because of its popularity and reliability. We discuss design alternatives, motivate those selected 
for this experiment and illustrate how they have been implemented. Our results are evaluated, highlighting some areas for 
future work. 
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1 Introduction 
Persistent progrmnming lm1guages extend general purpose 
languages by providing persistence for data of any type; 
they were proposed as m1 alternative to conventional data-
base systems in [2]. As a result of its progrrunming lm1-
guage origins, the large body of research that has arisen in 
this area has failed to adequately examine data-oriented 
issues [7], particularly as regards metadata and security 
management. This paper describes an attempt to rectify 
tJ1is situation by including these facilities in the CPOMS 
(Persistent Object Management System in C) [4]. This ma-
chine was chosen as the basis for our experiment because 
it is well established ru1d flexible, having been used by a 
variety of persistent lru1guages [l, 3, 6, 9-12]. Our aim 
wali to improve this environment ru1d at the srune time ex-
tend its applicability, so that it is capable of supporting 
a wider rru1ge of progrrunming lru1guage features. The 
paper begins by introducing the concept of a persistence 
machine. The differences between a persistence environ-
ment ru1d conventional DBMS scenarios are highlighted, 
ru1d lhc implications for type mru1agement and data protec-
tion are discussed. We exmnine alternative approaches to 
security ru1d metadata hru1dling in this context, and explain 
tJ1e options selected for the extended CPOMS. These are 
described from the user viewpoint ru1d at the implementa-
tion level. The paper concludes with ru1 evaluation of the 
work ru1d suggcslions for future research. 
2 Background 
This section introduces the notion of a persistent language 
and describes its advru1tages over a conventional database 
environment. We lhen outline the CPOMS system in terms 
of its databtL~e-oricnted instructionsru1d its 1mmagement of 
tJ1e data slore. In conclusion, the effects of this architecture 
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on metadata and security subsystems are presented. 
Persistent Languages 
A persistent progrmnming language extends a general pur-
pose language by allowing data of any type to remain on 
disk after execution tenninates. This data is kept on a data-
base, but is manipulated identically to conventional, tran-
sient data. In other words, it is impossible to tell whether 
a program statement is handling conventional heap objects 
or database items, because the same structures and oper-
ators are used in both contexts. This environment offers 
several advantages; experience with PS-Algol [12) showed 
that productivity increased, program code was shortened 
and maintenance simplified, compared with conventional 
database applications [2). In the first place, programmers 
do not need to learn a separate database language with its 
own types and operators. A program fragment is expressed 
independently of the persistence of data it uses. Secondly, 
there is no need for code that translates objects from data-
base fonnat into progrrunming language fonnat and vice 
versa; nor for statements that move data between disk and 
main memory every time a database is accessed. Studies 
have shown that such code typically talces up 30 percent of 
m1 application program [2]. Furthermore, the database is 
able to support tl1e complex data types ru1d data structures 
of the progrrunming lru1guage, ru1d is not restricted to flat 
files or first nonnal fonn relations. 
The Ohject Management System 
The CPO MS [ 4] was originally developed for the persistent 
Iru1guage PS-Algol. It mruiages the persistent store contain-
ing all database data, and will automatically retrieve or save 
objects there when necessary. It provides for flexibility 
through simplicity, and has been used to support a variety 
of lru1guages [l, 6, 9-12). This paper describes an exten-
sion of this system to incorporate metadata and security 
mru1agement, without chru1ging its interface or introducing 
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any restrictions on the kinds of language supported. In this 
way, the new features are available to a wide range of per-
sistent languages. Before giving details of this extension, 
some description of the workings of the CPOMS is in order. 
The persistent store is divided into a number of data-
bases which form the unitoflocking. That is, each database 
may be concurrently opened by one writer or many readers. 
Inter-database references are pennitted however, so data-
bases are not independent collections. Any type of data 
may be added to the store at any time; there is no schema 
restricting database contents or curtailing data organisation. 
To minimise database store and retrieve commands, 
only so-called "primary" objects are explicitly written to 
(using "Enter") or fetched from (using "Lookup") a data-
base. The majority of items are automatically inserted on 
the store using the principle of reachability, whereby the 
system automatically stores on disk all objects referenced 
by persistent data. In other words, the transitive closure 
of pointer references from a primary becomes persistent. 
For example, if a program creates a large tree structure and 
Enters its root, the entire tree persists. When the machine 
detects a pointer dereference which is a disk address, it au-
tomatically copies the item off the store into memory. The 
system keeps a record of objects that have already been 
placed in memory, to prevent repeated accesses. Changes 
are only written back to a database when a "Commit" state-
ment is executed. This enables a program to apply a trans-
action atomically: that is, either all its changes are applied 
to the store, or none. Commit also writes new objects to 
the store, placing these on the same page as the data that 
references them wherever, possible. As there can be several 
poiliter paths to an item, it cannot in general be detennined 
on which database a non-primary object resides. 
Implications for Data Management 
The CPOMS environment has two fundamental properties, 
neither of which applies to conventional databa~e systems, 
that affect metadata and security management. Firstly, 
it adheres to the Persistence Principle [2] that underlies 
all persistent languages; and furthennore it must be suf-
ficiently flexible to support a wide range of programming 
languages. In this section we consider the effects of each 
of tJ1ese characteristics in tum. 
The persistence principle [2] states tliat there should 
be no distinction between tnmsient ru1d persistent objects. 
Progrruns should be able to freely and implicitly add new 
types of data to the store; tl1ere must be no schema defining 
"persistent types", ru1d no database-related specifications 
in programs. Reading ru1d writing to a dataha~c is largely 
trru1sparcnt in progrrun text; ru1d it is impossible to distin-
guish database objects in the code. 
The absence of a schema makes it extremely difficult 
to find out about the types of objects on a database ru1d so 
there is a real need for some metadata query facility. There 
crumot be some program section declaring the database 
types to be used, or its authorisation to access information. 
Special hru1dling of databa5e objects, e.g. to check tl1eir 
security clearru1ce, is not possible at compile time because 
persistent objects are indistinguishable from other data. 
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Thus, in particular, attempts to illegally update an item 
cannot be detected until runtime. Nor can one tell by 
examining the program code at which points data is fetched 
from a database, although type- and security checking may 
be required. Since insertions are not explicit, it is only when 
executing Conunit that unauthorised creation of objects 
can be detected. Deletions are only evident on garbage 
collection, which occurs after all programs have ceased 
using the persistent store. 
"" The metadata system must permit any kind of item to be 
stored, along with is complete type specification; not just 
nonnalised relations or object-oriented objects. Without 
this flexibility, we would have to limit the languages that 
can be supported. Thus the internal metadatarepresentation 
must in no way restrict the types allowed on the store. Type 
checking must be performed by any persistent system, to 
ensure that the type of a database object conforms to that 
expected by the program wishing to use it. It is possible 
to do all this type checking statically - but only if the 
compiler is written in a persistent language (and is thus 
able to access the metadata) and only if the language has 
no dynamic typing. In order to support other persistent 
environments as well, it is necessary to provide for runtime 
type checking of database data. 
The majority of persistent_ languages which are cur-
rently supported by the system have no notion of sets or 
classes. Instead, because of the reachability principle, most 
databases consist mainly of networks of objects connected 
through pointers. Graph structures do not lend themselves 
to security enforcement as easily as simpler structures like 
sets, sequences or bags. Access predicate protection (eg 
all employees where salary > 9999) ru1d statistical control 
(whereby individual values are inaccessible but averages, 
minima, etc. are disclosed) are hard to provide for in an 
environment where data is available through reachability. 
It becomes difficult to ensure that data which a program is 
entitled to use is accessible to it along some path; and also 
to enforce the protection of ru1 item which is reachable via 
· many routes. As an exrunple, consider the case of a write-
protected pointer. This can prevent unauthorised alteration 
of the pointer value, but crumot prevent the contents of the 
target object from being changed. Write-protection along 
a pointer path is easily circumvented, since a program can 
always construct a new database item having a pointer to 
the target object ru1d then edit it through this new path, as 
shown in Figure 1. 
unprotected path 
Figure 1. Write-protection of pointers cannot prevent target 
object alteration. 
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3 Extending the System 
Tue extended CPOMS [3] has four new features: metadata 
management, security, set.types and complex objects; only 
the first two are discussed in this paper. Metadata is auto-
matically maintained to allow type checking and security 
enforcement, and to permit querying of type information. 
Thus users are able to learn about a database, recall type 
specifications or study the mix of data across databases, 
etc. This metadata is also available to system software like 
browsers and diagnostic aids. 
The type system of a programming language is but 
one way of protecting data from misuse. Preventing unau-
thorised disclosure or alteration of certain information is 
equally important in most database applications. Our se-
curity subsystem protects database items· from being ex-
amined, changed, deleted or created without appropriate 
authorisation. 
For the sake of completeness, we note the new types 
supported by the extended system: a set type was devel-
oped to cater for bulk data collections, and nested structures 
were introduced to directly support languages with com-
plex data [3]. Previously, all values had to be atomic; any 
structured component was implemented as a pointer to a 
separate object. 
4 Metadata Management 
Since metadata handling is affected by the introduction of 
security control, we firstconsiderasystem without database 
protection. Looking at type maintenance alone therefore, 
we outline our requirements for the metadata management 
system. Its implementation is described in the two subsec-
tions that follow. 
Using Type Information 
There are two reasons for keeping meta.data: to pennit the 
types on a database to be queried; and for type checking 
purposes. 
Interrogation by the User 
Metadata incorporates type definitions, security, owner-
ship, instm1ce counts, placement infonnation and cross ref-
erences. 'The last of these is optional - if there are a large 
number of inter-related types. the additional space required 
for storing inverse relationships may not be warranted. All 
types are treated identically, including Stm1dard types m1d 
component types having a definition but no nmne. For 
exmnple, if a component is declared to be an array with el-
ements of type X, this unnmned array type will be included 
in cross-references to X. 
Since inter-object references can span several data-
bases, it cannot always be detennined on which database 
a persistent object will be placed. Therefore type names 
must be unique across the entire store and type-related 
access privileges must be the smne for all databases. A 
progrmn can then have a new object stored on m1y database 
without conflicts arising, and can make copies of m1 object 
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even if some of these end up being stored on a different 
database. 
Type infonnation can be obtained interactively using a 
metadata query utility. This allows programmers to learn 
about a database prior to writing code that will access it. 
Within a program, standard metadata access functions are 
available; for example, one of these returns the number of 
occurrences of a given type on a given database. Metadata 
can be accessed in the same way as data. Since type infor-
mation is organised in sets, and the set operations available 
are relationally complete, this fonn of metadata querying 
is particularly easy. The sets are indexed in such a way 
that queries relating to a specific type, field or person are 
efficiently handled (information on a person identifies the 
types for which they are responsible). Queries are phrased 
with respect to a particular database, all databases currently 
open, the persistent store as a whole, or all currently reach-
able data (i.e. including non-database items created by the 
program). 
Type checking 
Program declarations must be checked against database 
types to prevent persistent data from being wrongly in-
terpreted or manipulated. For languages where all typing 
is static, it is sufficient to type check each primary on a 
Lookup and to add to metadata when new primaries are 
Entered. This requires that every primary be associated 
with a type object on the database, which is some encoded 
representation of its type declaration. Naturally all non-
standard types referenced must also be fully specified. The 
compiler includes encoded type declarations in the object 
code so that the runtime system can add new types to the 
metadata. 
An important feature of the CPOMS is its ability to 
support languages with dynmnic typing. For example, PS-
Algol has untyped pointers, so pointer dereferences require 
dynmnic type checking. As dynmnic typing may be nec-
essary for objects retrieved from a database, all persistent 
objects include a pointer to their type. If a pointer deref-
erence causes m1 object to be fetched from the store. the 
system converts the database representation of its type into 
the required heap format, to permit the dynamic type check-
ing that follows. When a newly persistent item is written 
to a database, the system ensures that its type pointer refer-
ences the correct Persistent Type. Before explaining how 
these tasks have been implemented, the internal storage of 
type infonnation is outlined. 
Internal Metadata Representation 
This section briefly describes how type infonnation is 
stored; firstly on the persistent store and secondly on the 
local heap. For a more detailed description of the data 
structures used and the reasons behind their choice, the 
reader is referred to [3]. 
Metadata comprises a set of Persistent Type objects, 
each of which encapsulates the definition of one data type 
referenced on a database. There is a separate copy of every 
Persistent Type on each database where it is used, so as to 
reduce metadata access conflicts. A central metadata repos-
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itory in the fonn of a system-owned database METADB is 
used to maintain consistency across databases. 
All data objects include a pointer to their type in their 
header, as this is needed for languages with dynamic typing. 
It should be pointed out that type pointers are useful in any 
persistent system for facilities such as type-related security 
and physical clustering by type [3]. The links between 
persistent data and metadata are illustrated in Figure 2. 
A type declaration was initially encoded as a string, 
but this was replaced by a scheme using type graphs. A 
single node in this graph represents one data type T; if T 
references another type U (e.g. U is the type of a field or 
element of T), then there is a pointer to the node for U. 
Thus structured types take the fonn of a graph. This repre-
sentation speeds up type checking, simplifies the interface 
to metadata, saves space [5], facilitates garbage coll~tion 
of types and avoids keeping in memory infonnation which 
is not actually needed during execution [3]. The only po-
tential problem with a graph fonnat is that it might limit 
the type constructors that can be supported, and we do not 
wish to place any restrictions on languages that may use 
the system. To illustrate this, suppose we were supporting 
a single language with say M type constructors. We could 
have M + 1 kinds of node in the type graphs: M kinds to 
store the infonnation for the M constructors and an addi-
tional one for standard types. Since we wish to make the 
representation completely general however, a combination 
of strings ru1d graphs is used. Each node in the graph is 
a string, ru1d so cru1 be a compacted representation of any 
type declaration whatsoever. Within this string, referenced 
types are represented by the special symbol "%%", along 
with a pointer to the node for that type. 
Metadata Persistent 
set types 
Data 
objects 
Figure 2. Metadata on the persistent store. 
In addition to metadata recorded on the persistent store, 
trru1sient types must also be kept in memory so that they cru1 
be compared against their persistent counterparts, or added 
to the metadata if necessary. Object code thus includes 
encoded type declarations. Each of these is associated with 
a type number, which is allocated according to the order-
ing of declarations in tl1e progrrun text. Instructions witJ1 
types as parruneters identify tl1ese by type number. At run-
time, the encoded declarations are used to create "Local 
Type" objects, which are kept in ru1 array indexed on type 
number. These Local Types contain type name, the en-
coded type definition, security data ru1d tJ1e disk addresses 
of the corresponding type on different databases. After the 
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type has been checked against its database counterpart, the 
definition is replaced by a flag indicating if type checking 
succeeded. 
Implementing Type Management 
To manage type infonnation in the persistent store, the 
system needs to ensure that type checking is done where 
necessary, that the type pointer in every object's header is 
correct, and that new infonnation is added to metadata on 
the persistent store when appropriate. 
Type checking 
It would appear that checking program types against their 
definition on the persistent store must be done as each ob-
ject is retrieved from a database. Since it cannot be deter-
mined statically which pointer traversals access persistent 
data, the interpreter would have to be infonned of the type 
expected with every pointer dereference and would carry 
the overhead of always testing if type checking is required. 
Fortunately a more efficient approach is possible however: 
when we encounter a primary object Lookup, deep type 
checking is perfonned. This ensures that all data reachable 
from there can subsequently be retrieved without checking. 
A compiler which is itself written in a persistent lan-
guage can access the store and type check primary struc-
tures statically. Should this not be the case, the extended 
CPOMS will do so at runtime when executing a Lookup; 
the compiler simply has to supply the type number of the 
primary type. To check type compatibility, declarations in 
the Local Type array are compared with type graphs on the 
persistent store. Deep type checking stops when a Local 
Type is encountered that is already flagged. If type check-
ing succeeds, the database address of the Persistent Type is 
recorded so that any newly persistent objects of this type 
Cc:'Ul have their type pointers set accordingly. Type graphs 
on the heap are disposed of after type checking. 
Newly Persistent Objects 
Progrruns create objects by meru1s of a New instruction . 
. 'The object code for a New statement includes a parruneter 
identifying the object's type. When the instruction is exe-
cuted, this type number is used to index to the appropriate 
Local Type, ru1d the type pointer in the header of the new 
object is made to point there. Thus it is always possible to 
detennine data type by following this pointer. 
The Commit instruction creates new items on the per-
sistent store. It must first examine such objects to check 
their type ru1d to add new types to the metadata. Com-
mit also has the task of identifying these newly persistent 
objects and updating the type pointer in their headers to 
reference the corresponding Persistent Type. Now an ob-
ject X cru1 only be created on the store if some persistent 
object points to X, or if X is Entered. If X is refer-
enced by a persistent object, then its type will already have 
been checked before its parent was accessed. Therefore to 
hru1dle newly persistent objects, the only additional type 
checking required is ensuring that new primaries confonn 
with the types expected on a database. This can be done by 
deep type checking new primaries, either on Commit or on 
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Enter. 
The checking is perfonned on Commit to cater for 
situations where a program chooses not to Commit a trans-
action in which an illegal Enter occurred. It is in any case 
more efficient to check then, because the Local Type needs 
to be located during Commit in any case, to set type pointers 
in object headers. Commit follows the type pointer from a 
new object's header to the Local Type, and checks the flags 
there. If this indicates a type mismatch, then the Commit 
aborts. Otherwise, the address of the corresponding Persis-
tent Type on the database is obtained from the Local Type 
and the type pointer in the object header is overwritten with 
this value. The type is added to the metadata of a database 
if it is new there; if the type is totally new to the persistent 
store, it is added to the METADB database as well. 
5 The Security Subsystem 
Security Policy 
When designing a security system, there are several aspects 
to decide, including granularity, privileges, authorisation 
method, access right specification and the points at which 
control is enforced. This section discusses the choices 
made in our experiment. 
Granularity 
In most database systems, security is a property of data 
type. In the extended CPOMS, one can protect not only 
whole databases or entire types, but also individual objects. 
The objects that can be protected independently are the pri-
mary objects. Security cru1 be enforced at the component 
level, ru1d read- ru1d write-privileges are distinguished. We 
have not distinguished between insertion, update ru1d dele-
tion rights because these are not explicit operations in a 
persistent environment. 
Authorisation Method 
Three common authorisation methods are lock-ru1d-key 
schemes, classification mechanisms and the use of priv-
ilege lists (see e.g. [8]). The lock-and-key approach typi-
cally associates a secret string (the lock) witJ1 a protected 
item; access to the affected data is then restricted to those 
who are able to supply this string (the key). The last of 
these methods a~sociatcs with a type (or object) a list of 
userid-authorisation pairs. Only users appearing in this 
list may access the type (or object); the authorisation part 
indicates which operations that user is entitled to perform 
on instances of that type (or on that single object). Classi-
fication methods are not considered further since they are 
too inflexible for most enterprises: each user ru1d each ob-
ject is assigned a security level, ru1d users may only access 
items at tlleir level or below. For exrunple, if the levels are 
ordered Unprotected, Confidential, Secret ru1d Top-Secret 
then a user rated "Secret" can work witll items classified 
Secret, Confidential or Unprotected, but not Top-Secret 
ones. One difference between tlle remaining two methods 
is that privilege lists a~sociate rights witll users; but with 
lock-ru1d-key systems, authorisation is a property of a pro-
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gram or procedure. It is more logical that security clearance 
should be detennined by the task being perf onned, rather 
than according to the person executing this task. To restrict 
the users who may run a program, should this be necessary, 
is a separate issue which can be handled by the program 
itself. Another advantage of tlle lock-and-key approach is 
that it requires less space on the store for recording autho-
risations. 
Since database-related specifications are out of place in 
a persistent environment, a problem arises as to how secu-
rity clearance can be established. Privilege list authorisa-
tion takes the fonn of statements like "Grant Read Access 
on StudentType to Bloggs" or "Grant Write Access on Win-
nerObject to Bloggs". Such security-related statements are 
clearly database-oriented and violate the persistence princi-
ple. Privilege list schemes thus require a separate utility for 
granting access rights, and newly persistent types and ob-
jects are completely inaccessible to all but their creator until 
this utility is run. On the other hand, lock-and-key schemes 
are easily and neatly incorporated within programs by us-
ing passwords as parruneters to Lookup, Enter and type 
declarations. Instead of statements like "Readkey for Stu-
dentType is XYZ", passwords can be given in declarations 
e.g. "Type StudentType (XYZ) = ... " or as parruneters e.g. 
Lookup(WinnerObject, MyDB, "XXY"). A consequence 
of this approach is that type protection is then dependant 
on scope. This raises a problem if the language has dy-
namic typing or structural equivalence: an object can be 
accessible in different scopes which have different security 
clearru1ce for that type. This scoping problem does not 
apply to privilege list systems simply because declarations 
are made in separate utilities rather than within application 
programs. 
The lock-and-key method was selected for the ex-
tended CPOMS. The one difficulty it presents (i.e. scop-
ing) is limited to. languages with structural equivalence or 
dynamic typing, and a policy was devised to cope with this 
problem. Protection is always detennined by the scope in 
which data is retrieved from the store. An advantage of this 
· policy is that library routines can force the calling program 
to fetch ru1 object; its security clearance then reflects the 
privileges afforded tlle caller, and its use within tlle rou-
tine will be restricted accordingly. Autllorisation to insert 
a new object on tlle store is detennined by the privileges 
held at tlle time the item was created. Thus new data can 
be Committed in any scope; even if its type is no longer 
in scope at all! In any case, to enforce security according 
to current scope is far too costly - it means re-establishing 
autJ1orisat.ion on every access to every value, persistent or 
transient. 
Passwords are given witll type declarations and, for 
primaries, tlley are supplied as parruneters of Lookup and 
Enter. Keys may be given as variables instead ofliterals, so 
security clearru1ce cru1 be tailored to the program's end-user. 
Complex objects cru1 comprise any number of protected 
components. These keys are specified as a set of strings, 
since a set parruneter is a convenient way of passing an 
indetenninate number of values. 
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Access Privileges 
To access an object requires authorisation to use both its 
type and its "access path". For a primary, access path means 
the right to Lookup that object; for an object reached via 
a pointer dereference it means authorisation to read that 
pointer. As a result, having clearance for a type, its in-
stances can be accessed via any authorised path, irrespec-
tive of rights to other paths. If some component of an 
object (i.e. a field or element) is read-protected, then nei-
ther this value nor the object as a whole may be referenced; 
only its other components are accessible. This prevents it 
being copied to a variable where that component is unpro-
tected. Similarly, if unauthorised to write to a component, 
other components may be assigned new values - but not 
that component, nor the object in its entirety. In partic-
ular, write-protection of a pointer compoi1ent implies that 
the referenced object cannot be destroyed - that is, the 
pointer cannot be altered to NIL to make the target object 
unreachable. 
In the case of a read-only pointer component, the pro-
tection does not prevent changing the contents of the refer-
en~ object (see Figure 1). For example, suppose Winner 
is a write-protected pointer to a Person instance. It can-
not be changed without the necessary write-authorisation 
to Winner; but the contents of that Person (e.g. Name, Ad-
dress, etc.) can be updated. However, the change will 
cause all relationships of the affected object to refer to the 
new individual, and hence is unlikely to go undetected. In 
a relational system, such a Winner attribute would contain 
the key of some Person tuple. Chru1ging the Winner would 
involve associating this identifier with a different person. 
If user-visible keys serve as identifiers the change is not 
possible, since e.g. a person's Social Security Number can-
not be chru1ged. Otherwise, the situation is analogous to 
that of the extended CPOMS. · 
Enforcement Points 
It is not possible to enforce security at compile-time be-
cause persistent objects crurnot be distinguished from trru1-
sient ones; ru1d t11e points at which objects move between 
disk ru1d memory cmrnot be determined until runtime. Since 
ru1y persistent object cru1 contain a pointer to a primary, it is 
also impossible to statically enforce security on primaries. 
Thus protection of persistent data takes place at runtime. 
A read-violation occurs a~ soon a~ an illegal attempt is 
made to access a persistent value. Write pennission could 
similarly be checked on every input, assignment statement 
and parameter pass. The only bencfi tin immediate I y check-
ing write pennission is that it simplifies debugging. How-
ever this is very costly, particularly as it will be done for 
trm1sicnt objects as well m1d will be repeated every time a 
value is chru1ged. Ibere is also the possibility that a pro-
grrun may be terminated because of ru1 invalid write when 
in fact it had not intended to Commit the trm1saction. As 
it is only on Commit that newly persistent objects become 
apparent, database insertions cmmot be checked for write 
pennission until this stage. Therefore it is more consistent 
to detect all write-violations on Commit. This is a logical 
point at which to do so, m1d is a far more efficient approach. 
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Representing Security Information 
Before discussing security enforcement, the storage of ac-
cess privileges is outlined in this section. We first describe 
how Local Types record security clearance, and then iden-
tify the access rights attached to individual data items. 
The type descriptions in the object code include these-
curity strings associated with a type. With each Local Type, 
the system initially keeps pointers to these passwords. As 
with type checking, a Lookup causes security clearance to 
be established for the types involved, disposing of pass-
word strings and recording authorisation in security flags 
associated with the Local Type. To store authorisations for 
individual components of a structured type, 2N security 
bits are stored with the Local Type (where N is the size of 
its instances in words). There is one read- and one write-bit 
for each word to cater for nested structures. To cover the 
case where a component is itself complex, with individu-
ally protected components, access privileges are kept at the 
word level rather thru1 the component level. 
To attach access rights to data, four bits of the ob-
ject header are used: the read-only, partly-readable, partly-
writable and is-primary flags. Partly-readable/writable ap-
plies only to complex data with protected components. 
Whenever a persistent object is fetched from disk, these 
flags are set according to the clearance associated with its 
Local Type. An extra N authorisation bits are attached to 
structured objects; where a bit_is set if the corresponding 
word is inaccessible. Although they are associated with 
individual objects rather thru1 (Local) types, these flags re-
quire a negligible amount of extra memory in return for 
rapid checking of read pennission, which must be per-
fonned on every component reference. Write-protection of 
fields is not carried with data in this way: the information 
is obtained by following the object's type pointer to the 
associated Local Type. The deferring of write-checks until 
Commit meru1s this extra access to the Local Type does not 
occur too frequently. 
Security Enforcement 
. This section illustrates how the data structures above are 
utilised to ensure tl1at objects imported from the store are 
properly protected, ru1d that new items are not written to a 
database unless a progrmn has the right to do so. 
Determining Privileges 
Authorisation to manipulate database data cannot be deter-
mined at compile time because it is not known statically 
which pointer dereferences cause objects to be fetched from 
the persistent store. 'Therefore every database retrieval 
needs to fetch not only the desired data object but also its 
type, and record its security clearance accordingly. The 
alternative is to include type number as part of a pointer 
dereference instruction; this was not implemented because 
only a small minority of pointer traversals will actually 
require database access. 
With lock-mid-key protection, the "locks" associated 
with the database type need to be checked against the "keys" 
provided in its progrrun declaration. The security bits of 
a Local Type are set during type checking: deep checking 
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ensures the correct protection of embedded structures. On 
a database retrieval, the type pointer in the object's header 
identifies its Persistent Type. A map from Persistent Type 
address to type name is kept in memory. The type name is 
used to identify the corresponding Local Type, and security 
flags in the data header are then set according to the security 
bits attached to this Local Type. 
Primary protection is applied whenever an object re-
trieved from the persistent store has the is-primary bit set 
(not only on a Lookup). The Offset instruction, which 
advances to some field of a structure, checks component 
authorisation by examining the component-read-flags at-
tached to the object. This instruction includes a parameter 
giving the size of the value being accessed, so that the 
corresponding number of bits may be checked. 
The Effect of Program Scope 
If a language uses structural equivalence or dynamic typing, 
a database object fetched onto the heap during a particular 
procedure call C, can be accessed outside this scope as 
well. It will then be associated with a different type decla-
ration, and so its protection may differ in different scopes. 
As explained earlier, the protection of an object is deter-
mined by the scope in which the program retrieved it from 
the store: the data can only be used accordingly in other 
scopes. Since security c1earance is a property of objects 
on the program heap, not of databases, this inf onnation is 
maintained by the runtime system (the persistent store is 
not affected) in a manner described below. 
To keep track of scope chru1ges, we cru1 either maintain 
a single set of current types which is updated on every func-
tion call and exit, or we can keep a list of sets (similar to the 
way scoping is done with a static chain). Because of exten-
sive support for indexing [3], the former approach has been 
used; indexing a single collection is faster than searching a 
chain. A CurrentMeta index on typenrune points to types 
currently in scope. FunGtion calls adjust CurrentMeta by 
deleting lypes no longer in scope ~md inserting new ones. 
When a new type is encountered on scope entry, any type 
in CurrentMeta with the srune nrune must be replaced; the 
situation is reversed when the routine tenninates. The acti-
vation record of each routine includes two sets, New-types 
ru1d Old-types. On routine exit, CurrentMeta ha~ all New-
typcs removed ruul all Old-types restored. 
Write Protection 
To provide atomicity, the Commit routine has two phases. 
ribe first validates all databa\e chru1ges made by the trm1s-
action ru1d writes copies of their original state to a Be-
fore Looks File. The second ph,L~e wriles new data to the 
store. The first phase enforces all write protection: newly 
persistent data ruul chru1ged databa\e items must be vali-
dated. Before Committing a new object to the store, its 
type pointer is always traversed to obtain U1e appropriate 
Local Type. From this U1e progrrun's right to create such 
data is detennined. 
With updated items, the first step is to consult the ob-
ject's read-only flag, and abort immediately if it is set. If 
the part-writable flag is set, the read-only fields are identi-
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fled by exrunining the associated Local Type. Component 
write-protection can be applied at little extra cost by com-
paring current values against original values (obtained for 
the Before Look) to detect alteration of read-only fields. 
6 Conclusion 
We have shown how to maintain infonnation on the types 
in use on a persistent store, without limiting the persistent 
l&nguages it is able to support. We illustrated how this 
infonnation can be employed to type check database usage 
and provide for flexible metadata querying. The imple-
mentation of a security system was described and its use by 
languages with dynamic typing and structural equivalence 
was outlined. We conclude by discussing the benefits and 
di~vantages offered by the resulting system, and identify 
some areas requiring futher work. 
Evaluation 
The introduction of data protection requires negligible 
space; but extra local heap dereferences on persistent store 
retrievals, to check authorisation, are unavoidable. 
The CPOMS pennits one writer or mru1y readers to 
access a database concurrently. It is for this reason that 
the types in use on a database are described by Persistent 
Type objects on that srune database. Several databases 
can have existing persistent types added to their metadata 
concurrently, as this requires at worst only read access to 
METADB. However, once a progrrun introduces a new type 
to the persistent store, no other run-unit can simultaneously 
copy a type to a new database, since METADB is open for 
writing. Metadata handling is thus complicated because 
inter-object references are not limited by the unit oflocking. 
We conclude that until concurrency is properly supported, 
inter-database references should not be allowed. 
The use of pointers to reference related objects, rather 
than keys (as in relational systems for example), permits a 
more flexible security system. There can be multiple paths 
. to an object, enabling a progrrun authorised to traverse any 
one of these paths to use the data concerned. In addition, 
confidential parts of a complex object can be stored sep-
arately, and kept private by read-protecting the pointer to 
these values. The existence of named primary structures 
enables these objects to have individual protection. They 
may still be referenced by other persistent objects, so data 
structuring is unaffected by this. It is more efficient to check 
for write-violations when a database is updated, rather than 
on every instruction that chru1ges some value. The Commit 
statement that demarkates the end of a transaction means 
that all dalaha\e chru1ges made by that transaction can be 
validated together at a logical point in the program execu-
tion. 
In the original CPOMS all the components of an ob-
ject had to be atomic. This restriction has been removed 
by allowing for nested structures [3], in order to support 
languages with complex data types. Such complex objects 
were seen to require more space for read-flags and to be 
more cumbersome to protect (eg the Offset instruction re-
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quires· the size of the value to subsequently be extracted). 
The bulk data type we introduced proved useful for non-
procedural access to metaclata, and facilitated the handling 
of cross-references, variants, local metaclata and persistent 
types. 
Compilers for persistent languages should themselves 
be written in a persistent language so that they are able to 
access metaclata and type check database structures. This 
would remove the burden of type checking from the runtime 
system. Security cannot be enforced statically because per-
sistent store retrievals are not distinguishable in program 
code. Data flow analysis could be used to detect pointer 
dereferences involving disk addresses and to flag the sym-
bol table entry for the corresponding object according to 
its security clearance. However this analysis is limited by 
end-user inputs and database values, which are not known 
statically. Hence the runtime system would still need to au-
thorise accesses; the only.benefit of static checking would 
be to raise some errors at compile time - but execution time 
would not improve. 
Future Work 
Several extensions to the existing metadata management 
system are possible. If part of a program type definition 
is incompatible with that of the store, the security subsys-
tem could be used to treat the object as partly-readable, 
instead of terminating execution. We suggest·that the en-
tire item be write-protected, as it seems unreasonable to 
allow a·program to alter an object if its type is not fully 
known. More sophisticated protection of set types should 
be possible, such as access predicate and statistical con-
trol. Furthermore, persistent functions create opportunities 
for protection of behavioural infonnation, which has not 
been investigated. Instead of dynamically keeping track 
of scope for type-related security, it appears in retrospect 
that it might have been better to do this at compile time, by 
making the pointer dereference instruction include the type 
number of the target object. Although this would be used 
only infrequently - when a database retrieval occurred -
this overhead may be justified by the resulting simplication 
off unction entry and exit. 
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